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Tensions between society and the uniformed leaders of the military have produced
disastrous results for some democracies. If the peaceful nature of American civil-military
relations is to continue through the twenty-first century, a certain level of understanding and
shared views need to exist between the military's senior leaders and society.
This thesis explores whether senior leaders of the naval service are becoming isolated
from society; and, if so, the implications this divide may have on civil-military relations.
Three measures ofcivil-military interaction—racial/ethnic representation, military experience,
and shared values—are used to assess the extent of isolation between the nation's naval
leaders and society. These measures of interaction are examined with historical and
projected statistics on racial/ethnic representation among naval officers, Congressional
voting records on defense-related legislation, and interviews with a sample of retired flag
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In the realm of civil-military relations, much has been written on the nature of senior
leaders of the armed forces--from a 1956 discussion of The Power Elite by C. Wright Mills
to more recent works by Jacques Van Doom, Morris Janowitz, Eliot Cohen, and Samuel
Huntington. A large body of literature also exists on the relationship between the armed
forces and society. This field includes The Soldier and the State . The Professional Soldier ,
and Armed Forces and Society , along with many other works. Missing, however, is a current
view of the nation's highest-ranking military leaders and their association with American
society.
Is the association of military leaders and American society important? Ifthe peaceful
nature of American civil-military relations is to continue through the twenty-first century,
a certain level of understanding and shared views need to exist between senior leaders of the
military and society. This thesis explores whether the flag and general officer corps of the
naval service is becoming isolated from society; and, if so, the implications this divide may
have on civil-military relations. Research focuses specifically on senior leaders ofthe United
States Navy (USN) and the United States Marine Corps (USMC), and their association with
society, to gauge the current state of civil-military relations. Three commonly-cited
measures of civil-military interaction or association—racial/ethnic representation, military
experience, and shared values—are used to assess the extent of isolation between the nation's
naval leaders and society.
1
Correcting a rupture in relations between society and naval leaders would require a
concerted effort on the part of both entities. Correcting these elements of measurement
alone, however, will not guarantee harmonious civil-military relations. A more comprehen-
sive examination of civil-military relations might encompass many more variables, such as
a wide assortment of background demographics, issues of gender—including the 1991
"Tailhook" scandal—and political party affiliations, to name a few. Instead, measures of
association in this study more narrowly address how these two groups may be brought closer
together to better represent the interests of both society and the military.
Senior military leaders are defined here as generals and admirals in the active service
of the four branches of the United States Armed Forces. The study looks exclusively at
senior leaders in the Navy and Marine Corps, otherwise referred to as general and flag
officers. These senior leaders include officers in pay grades 0-7 through 0-10, wearing one
through four stars, respectively. The pay grades and ranks of senior officers in the Navy and
Marine Corps are reflected in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1. Naval Flag and General Officer Rank Structure







0-9 Vice Admiral Lieutenant General
0-10 Admiral General
Why is it important to look at the senior leaders of the armed forces, particularly
those in the Navy and Marine Corps? There are two main reasons why the military's
generals and admirals should be studied. First, these leaders are supposed to represent the
very highest values and character of all military professionals. In many ways, military
service, military policy decisions, and service culture, are molded, directed, and formed by
the military's generals and admirals. A great deal of responsibility is held at the lower levels
of the services, but the ultimate decisions and authority below the civilian chain ofcommand
lie with the general and flag officers. Therefore, these military leaders are a key element in
the interaction of a military and society. Second, the policy decisions of these senior-most
leaders have a distinct impact on both international and domestic events (i.e., civil-military
relations). Samuel Huntington explains the unique nature ofthe military on the international
and domestic scene:
The most distinctive, the most fascinating, and the most troublesome aspect
of military policy is its Janus-like quality. Indeed, military policy not only
faces in two directions, it exists in two worlds. One is international politics,
the world of the balance of power, wars and alliances, the subtle and the
brutal uses of force and diplomacy to influence the behavior of other states.
The principal currency of this world is actual or potential military strength:
battalions, weapons, and warships. The other world is domestic politics, the
world of interest groups, political parties, social classes, with their conflicting
interests and goals. The currency here is the resources of society: men,
money, material. Any major decision in military policy influences and is
influenced by both worlds. 1
'Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense. Strategic Programs In National Politics .
Columbia University Press, New York and London, 1961, p. 1.
A connection can then be made in civil-military relations between society and its
military leaders. The Navy and Marine Corps, in particular, represent the cutting edge of
readiness, deployed forces, and influence around the world. This is evident over the past
several years with their documented influence on international events.2 Given the extensive
use of the naval service to enforce U.S. foreign policy, and as an instrument of American
societal views, it seems appropriate to explore the relationship of its top-most leaders with
society.
"Society" is generally defined as "...a highly structured system ofhuman organiza-
tion for large-scale community living that normally furnishes protection, continuity, security,
and a national identity for its members."3 C. Wright Mills draws a distinction between the
"public" and "mass society" when it comes to the "power elite" and how America's
democratic society works. As Mills writes:
In a public, as we may understand the term, (1) virtually as many people
express opinions as receive them. (2) Public communications are so
organized that there is a chance immediately and effectively to answer back
any opinion expressed in public. Opinion formed by such discussion (3)
readily finds an outlet in effective action, even against—if necessary—the
prevailing system of authority.
At the opposite extreme, in a mass, (1) far fewer people express opinions than
receive them; for the community of publics becomes an abstract collection
of individuals who receive impressions from the mass media. (2) The
2During the last several years the naval service has deployed forces in the form of Marine
Amphibious Units (MEU), Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG), and Carrier Task Forces (CTF), to
meet national foreign policy goals. These forces have most noticeably been seen in Somalia, Bosnia,
Haiti, and the North China Sea.
3Random House Webster's College Dictionary. Random House, New York, 1990, p. 1270.
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communications that prevail to answer back immediately or with any effect.
(3) The realization of opinion in action is controlled by authorities who
organize and control the channels of such action. 4
Although American society can hardly be described as a public democracy, based on
this definition, we have not fully gone down the road of a mass society either. As such, the
American people still retain the ability to voice their concerns and opinions formally through
federal, state, and local representation. Informally, representation occurs through the
influence of interest groups, public opinion, and corporate organizations, just to name a few.
Since democracies first began to flourish around the world, there has been concern
over the power of the military and the character of civil-military relations. As Eliot Cohen
points out in Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies , the Founding Fathers were quite
concerned about the dangers of creating a standing army. 5 In recent times, democracies
around the world have seen the crumbling of civil-military relations, resulting in revolutions,
open warfare, and military coups d'etat. 6 While these are distant cases from the United
States, they still provide concern for the future of American civil-military relations. The
4C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite. Oxford University Press, New York, 1959, pp. 303-304.
5Eliot Cohen, Commandos And Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies
.
Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978, p. 1 and 105 , makes reference to and
cites the Federalist Papers (New York: The Modern Library, 1937), p. 179. "In the Federalist
Papers, Alexander Hamilton, advocate of a standing army, tried to reassure those who mistrusted
the concept of a 'select corps.' He argued against their apprehensions that a professional soldiery
would endanger the liberties of a free people. He addressed thereby the fundamental anxiety of
civil-military relations—the fear that the guardians of the polity might turn against it. ...Federalist
Number 29 proposes the creation of a 'select corps' much smaller than the state militias, Hamilton
was careful not to call such a force a standing army, although that was clearly what he meant. He
said that the corps would: '...never be formidable to the liberties of the people while there is a large
body of citizens, little, if at all, inferior to them in discipline and the use of arms, who stand ready
to defend their own rights and those of their fellow citizens.'"
6Conflict in civil-military relations has been most evident in past hostilities within countries
such as Haiti, Former Yugoslavia, Argentina, Chile, Cuba, Afghanistan, Iran, and others.
enduring challenge is to ensure that the relationship between society and senior leaders of
the military remains consistent with our rich democratic heritage. By retaining society's
stake in the military, we prevent possible alienation and isolation of the two entities from
each other. This thesis uses three common yard sticks in society and politics to measure
isolation between our naval leaders and society. These are racial/ethnic representation,
military experience, and values.
B. ANALYSIS
Race, race relations, and racial representation continue to be central themes in
American politics, well after Henry David Thoreau and Ralph Waldo Emerson began writing
on the subjects in the 1860s. 7 Today, race-related issues are typically framed in terms of
"Black vs. White," but they obviously encompass a much larger blend of society. 8 Ethnicity
is another component ofAmerican society that is commonly overlooked and assumed to be
somehow blended away in the nation's great "melting pot."9
7Henery David Thoreau, Civil Disobedience , and Slavery In Massachusetts , and Ralph
Waldo Emerson's, Essay on Nature . Electronically Enhanced Text, 1991, World Library, Inc.,
Essays published in 1 849, 1 854, and 1 848, respectively.
8The U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census categorizes the population into four
racial and two ethnic groups: White, Black, American Indian, and Asian/Pacific Islander are the
racial groups; and Hispanic and Non-Hispanic are the two ethnic groups. While this method does
provide a convenient and simple way of dividing the population, it does not accurately account for
groups that cross several cultural boundaries or the many different subcultures of any one group.
9The term, "melting pot" actually originated in a popular 19th Century play of the same
name. Most people reject the notion that Americans have been so "blended" to lose their religious,
racial, or original ethnic identities. See Lawrence H. Fuchs, The American Kaleidoscope: Race.
Ethnicity, and the Civic Culture . Wesleyan University Press, Hanover and London, 1990, pp. 275-
276, 288.
In urban America, Dallas, Texas, symbolizes the ongoing racial tensions public
schools are experiencing today. School tensions in Dallas are partly due to the city's
changing racial makeup. Whites are a small minority of public school students, while still
comprising nearly half of the city's population. 10 At the same time, in March 1991, several
white police officers in the city of Los Angeles brutally beat Rodney G. King, a black man,
with night sticks. The officers were later charged with civil rights violations, and the
outcome of their trial sparked the "Los Angeles Riots," in which active duty marines
participated as "peacemakers." The examples of Dallas and Los Angeles raise some
disturbing questions about the state of race relations in America. The fact remains that racial
and ethnic issues continue to be unsettled and often divisive.
The U.S. population has been in racial and ethnic transition, from the time when the
first European settlers arrived in a land occupied by indigenous Indian tribes, to the arrival
of boat loads of slaves from Africa, through waves of both legal and illegal immigration, to
today's diverse composition. The nation was founded by white men, principally of English
and German descent, who were firmly dedicated to a Protestant work ethic. Over the years,
legal, illegal, and forced immigration has expanded the national population to include people
ofEuropean, African, Asian, Mexican, Latin American, and Middle Eastern descent, to name
10Public schools in Dallas, Texas, were 41 percent White, 45 percent Black, and 13 percent
Hispanic in 1975-1976. In 1995-1996, public schools were 12 percent White, 42 percent Black, and
44 percent Hispanic. The 1990 Census reflects the racial and ethnic composition of Dallas, Texas
to be, 48 percent White, 28 percent Black, 21 percent Hispanic, and 3 percent Other. This might
indicate that White children are being sent to public schools outside Dallas's school district, or that
White children are attending private schools in growing numbers. See Sue Anne Pressley, "In
diverse Dallas, a Power Struggle Over Schools: The nation's eight-largest city is still one ofthe most
stubbornly segregated," The Washington Post National Weekly Edition, October 7-13, 1996, p. 29.
a few. This ever-changing social fabric of the United States has been described in many
ways, based largely on the politics of the times. "In the course of American history,"
according to Milton M. Gordon's classic study ofAssimilation in American Life , "there have
been three theories of the assimilation process,"
...Anglo-conformity, the melting pot, and, more recently, cultural pluralism.
On the whole, the theory of Anglo-conformity postulates the complete
renunciation of the immigrant's ancestral culture in favor of the behavior and
cultural values of the Anglo-Saxon majority. 11
The "melting pot" is where all immigrant races are supposedly blended together in the great
crucible, losing their ancestral heritage and hatreds as they become an "American."
"Cultural pluralism" is where each immigrant's cultural heritage is interwoven to form an
"American Quilt" or mosaic of different cultures. By any description one may choose to
describe the nation, it is clear that the diversity of the population cannot be denied. This is
perhaps best captured in the motto of the "Great Seal of United States," which states E
Pluribus Unum—from many, one.
While Americans of almost all racial and ethnic backgrounds served in the nation's
military since its inception, a policy of racial/ethnic representation is only a recent under-
taking. On October 9, 1940, President Franklin Roosevelt abolished all-volunteer
enlistments in favor of a black quota for the Army. This policy decision has been seen as a
combination of the War Department's routine prewar mobilization plan, and a move by the
"Milton M. Gordon, Assimilation in American Life . New York, Oxford University Press,
1964, Quoted in E. Digby Baltzell, The Protestant Establishment Revisited , edited by Howard G.
Schneiderman, New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 1991, p. 217.
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president to accommodate civil rights activists concerning jobs in the military. The naval
service adopted a similar policy in 1942, attempting to maintain a racial or ethnic structure
that was roughly consistent with that of society. 12 The quota system has changed in name
and theory to racial and ethnic "recruiting goals," but the basic underlying premise is that the
composition of the military should somehow "reflect" society. Interestingly, over the years
since blacks were first recruited in proportion to their numbers in the national population,
they have become overrepresented in the military. 13 This is certainly true among the enlisted
ranks of the Navy and Marine Corps, where blacks, for example, accounted for
approximately 18 percent of the force in 1996~but not true among officers in these services,
where all minority racial or ethnic groups have been underrepresented (or unrepresented)
throughout American history.
Representation of minorities in the military, as well as in other institutions, continues
to be a controversial issue. Civil rights legislation on voting was passed by Congress in 1 965
and then amended in 1975 and 1982. This legislation helped restructure voting districts to
better support minority groups in the election of fellow minorities. Although this legislation
was later ruled unconstitutional, a continued emphasis on such legislation displays the
concern given to minority groups in America.
12Morris J. MacGregor, Jr, Integration of the Armed Forces 1940-1965 . Center of Military
History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., 1981, pp. 18-19.
I3
Ibid., p. vii. "In contrast to the racial proportionality that characterized U.S. armed forces
throughout most of the nation's history, the 410,000 blacks under arms in 1981 represent about 20
percent of all military personnel, a proportion far greater than the 1 1 or 12 percent of the total
population that is black. Moreover, blacks make up a still larger share of the ground combat forces:
one of every three Army GIs is black, as is one of every five enlisted marines."
Census Bureau projections show that racial and ethnic groups will increase by the
following amounts by the year 2050: 7.4 percent for whites, 69.5 percent for blacks, 258.3
percent for Hispanics, 83.0 percent for American Indians, and 269.1 percent for Asians. As
minority groups become a relatively larger part of the general population, it can only be
assumed that their political power will increase as well. While the military and society seem
able to accept an overrepresentation of minorities within the enlisted ranks, how will this
play out over time? Ifminority groups gain majority status as a percentage of the population,
should they "rightfully" have proportional representation within the most senior ranks of
America's institutions, including its military?
How important is it that our elected and appointed officials understand the military
through personal experience? The President, the President's cabinet, and both houses of
Congress are considered representatives of the American people and society. This level of
government has regular interaction with the flag and general officers of the naval service.
According to the Constitution, and the War Powers Act of 1973, there is a clear delineation
of power and responsibility among the President, Congress, and the armed forces. In
planning and executing domestic and foreign policy, there is a vital interaction of the
nation's top military officers, the President, and Congress. First-hand knowledge of military
matters by civilian leaders in apportioning money and planning foreign policy is critical for
a harmonious relationship to continue. If, however, elected officials and society begin to
lose touch with the intricacies of military service, the nation may find itself becoming
isolated from the military and its senior-most leaders.
10
A similar relationship might exist between a professional football coach and his team.
Would the players trust the judgment and opinions of a professional football coach who
never played the game before? As James Fallows writes:
A Washington writer named Don Winter pointed out in 1980 that of the 103
members of Congress who were officially part of the "Vietnam generation"
(men born between June 30, 1939, and June 30, 1954), only 14 (or about 14
percent) served on active duty anywhere in the military at any time during the
Vietnam war. By comparison, about 28 percent of the generation as a whole
served on active duty during Vietnam. While more than two thirds of all
senators born before 1939 had served on active duty, mainly in World War
II, only one third of senators and representatives born after 1939 had served
in any military capacity, including the reserves and the National guard. After
the elections of 1980, the number of congressmen with military experience
declined further still. 14
How can society expect its elected representatives to understand the intricacies of
defense planning, budgeting, and carrying out the military end of foreign policy when so few
of them have any practical military experience? In the military and government, as in
football or any field, if you want to "lead the team," then you had better "know the game."
What better way to understand how things operate than from first-hand experience? What
impact will there be on the senior leadership of the Navy and Marine Corps as they deal with
the White House and Congress in the future? Is society or the government becoming less
interested or less knowledgeable in military matters, creating a degree of isolation?
More fundamental than differing military experience in civil-military relations would
be a contrast in values held by military leaders compared with those held by society and their
14James Fallows, National Defense . Random House, New York, 1981, pp. 136-137.
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elected and appointed officials. Values are "...an individual's or group's ideas about the
worth or importance of people, things, and concepts." 15 Is there a difference between the
values held by the senior military officers and those of society and our elected officials? If
there is a difference, why is it so, and what impact may it have on civil-military relations?
Individual and group values are generally not formed in isolation, but are a process
of socialization throughout life's experience. Much research has documented differing views
of value development. Some researchers place the greatest emphasis on early childhood
development, while others put greater weight on life's maturing process. Despite this
specific disagreement, a commonly held position is that the process of socialization by
institutions has a tremendous effect on value development. 16 The importance of this is that
military leaders are socialized in a very different organization than, say, elected officials.
The result of this difference has the potential to isolate society from its senior military
leaders, as Janowitz observes:
Ultimately, political control of the military profession hinges on the answer
to the question: Why do officers fight?
Political democracies assume that officers can be effectively motivated by
professional ethnics alone. The officer fights because of his career commit-
ment.... He is amenable to civilian political control because he recognizes
that civilians appreciate and understand the tasks and responsibilities of the
15
"Values and the Leader," Leadership, Publication B0609, The Basic School, Marine Corps
Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia, 1989.
16Morris Janowitz in collaboration with Roger W. Little, Sociology And The Military
Establishment . Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, California, 1974.
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constabulary force. He is integrated into civilian society because he shares
its common values. 17
Value conflicts among military leaders and elected officials can potentially affect
civil-military relations. These conflicts also constitute the greatest challenge to military
leaders because ofthe difficulty in dealing with someone who genuinely dislikes what advice
or guidance is given on military matters or whose deeply held beliefs may differ from those
of the senior leader. If military leaders develop a genuinely different set ofvalues than those
held by society and its elected officials, tension and isolation may occur. If a conflict of
values occurs in our democracy's civil-military relations, will it cause tension between the
military's senior leaders and society or their elected officials? If tension is a result, are there
certain aspects of socialization that bring it to bear?
C. METHODOLOGY
The three measures of interaction or association—racial/ethnic representation, military
experience, and values—are developed to further understand military leaders and society.
The research provides a critical analysis of senior leaders in the officer corps ofthe Navy and
Marine Corps, and their association with society.
The first measure of association between senior officers and society is examined
using U.S. Bureau ofCensus population projections, with particular emphasis on the growing
racial and ethnic diversity in the population. In addition, past and present U.S. military racial
I7Morris Janowitz, The Future of the Military Profession , pp. 77-78., In War. Morality, and
the Military Profession , edited by Malham M. Wakin, Westview Press, Boulder, 1986, pp. 57-79.
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diversity figures are examined in relation to their corresponding U.S. population figures. The
second measure of association evaluates indications and the possible implications of the
President and Congress not having some military experience. Has this difference in
experience influenced policy decisions of judgment, warfighting needs, and individual
service qualification; and, if so, in what way and at what possible cost? This evaluation is
done through the careful review of Congressional records and published literature in
determining the military background of those who serve in Congress and the White House,
and recent policy decisions by the President and Congress pertaining to the senior leaders of
the Navy and Marine Corps. The third measure of association, values, is addressed by
comparing the ethos fostered by the military elite with that of the public. The study draws
heavily upon information gained from interviews or correspondence with seventeen retired
flag and general officers in the Navy and Marine Corps. (See Appendix.)
The next three chapters examine themes introduced above in greater detail. These
chapters assess whether racial/ethnic representation, military experience, and values can be
used to gauge the state of civil-military relations between naval leaders and society.
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II. RACIAL AND ETHNIC REPRESENTATION
A complex relationship exists in national security between many factors found in the
domestic, international, and political arenas. With the end of the Cold War, domestic
concerns have become relatively more important in determining how the U.S. organizes,
trains, equips, and staffs its armed forces. One particular area, population representation in
the military, has been a focus of interest since the end of the draft in 1 973, and it has received
renewed attention and emphasis during the post-Cold War, "downsizing" era. Eitelberg
wrote about representation in the military in 1986:
'Representation,' ...can provide a definitive answer to the longstanding
question: "Who shall serve when not all serve?" Fairness can be assured to
the extent that the few who do serve in the military compose a cross section
of all who are equally obligated to defend the nation; and one can assume all
sectors of society are represented when identified groups are present in
proportion to their presence in the total population—that is, when membership
of the military is mathematically similar in some way to the nation's
citizenry. 18
The Secretary of the Navy published a letter of instruction in 1995 that directs the
Navy and Marine Corps to achieve a composition of 12 percent black, 12 percent Hispanic,
and 5 percent Asian/Pacific Islander/Native American (and other minorities) among newly-
commissioned officers by the year 2000. This goal was also established for the composition
of the officer corps as a whole over the long-term. The Secretary's initiative has been called
the "12-12-5 Plan," and it virtually doubles the previous goals for representation of
18Mark J. Eitelberg, Representation and Race in America's Volunteer Military . Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, September 1986, p. 10.
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minorities in the officer corps. Operation Order 1-95, dated 17 March 1995, entitled
"Campaign Plan to Increase Diversity Within the Officer Corps ofthe Marine Corps," details
the reasons for diversity as stated by General Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps.
General Krulak's principal reason for this campaign plan is "...to achieve an officer corps
reflective of the racial composition of America." 19
In 1975, Morris Janowitz wrote about the racial composition of the All-Volunteer
Force and made some relevant comments. "In the ethnically pluralist society of the Untied
States," Janowitz observed:
...[R]ace constitutes our country's most fundamental cleavage. If our
American society is ever to realize its democratic goals, the direction its race
relations take in the armed forces will be a prime factor.
In a broader sense, Janowitz asked: "Can a political democracy expect to have a legitimate
form of government if its military is not broadly representative ofthe larger society?"20 This
chapter explores the racial and ethnic composition of flag and general officers and society.
Several questions are addressed. First, what is the current, and historic, racial and ethnic
composition of the flag and general officer corps, and can it be said to "reflect" society?
Second, will the changing distributions of racial/ethnic groups in the national population
somehow affect senior leaders of the naval service? Last, what do indicators of racial and
''Operation Order 1-95, Campaign Plan to Increase Diversity Within the Officer Corps of
the Marine Corps . 17 March 1995.
20Morris Janowitz, Military Conflict. Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, Inc., 1975, p. 284.
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ethnic representation say about senior leaders of the Navy and Marine Corps and their
relationship with civilian society?
A. COMPOSITION OF SENIOR LEADERS IN THE NAVY AND MARINE
CORPS
The composition of the flag and general officer corps is influenced by many factors
related to the accession, training, education, assignment, augmentation, promotion, and
development of naval officers. Before looking at the racial and ethnic composition of this
group, some common measurable factors are examined that characterize flag and general
officers, regardless of race or ethnicity. Given the difficult nature of examining each of the
important aspects of advancement in the naval service over several decades, the study
focuses initially on two measures commonly used in studies of flag and general officers.
These are average years in service and average years of education.
A large proportion of generals and admirals hold graduate degrees in a wide variety
of disciplines, although there is no stated requirement regarding educational level as an
officer rises through the ranks. Virtually all newly-commissioned officers today have at least
a bachelor's degree; and evidence shows that educational advancement beyond the
bachelor's level tends to enhance an officer's likelihood for promotion.
Tables 2. 1 and 2.2 depict the average years of education ofUSMC and USN flag and
general officers, in roughly five-year increments from 1971 to 1995. The mean average
years of education for officers in the combined pay grades 07 through 10, over the period
shown, are 17.5 years for USMC and 18 years for USN. Often, education beyond 16 years
17
Table 2.1. Average Years of Education for USMC General Officers
by Pay Grade, Selected Years, 1971-1995
Pay Grade 1971* 1975* 1980* 1985 1990 1995
0-10 16.0 16.0 18.0 16.5 16.0 17.0
0-9 17.3 18.5 18.3 16.3 16.8 16.8
0-8 18.5 17.6 18.8 16.7 16.7 16.7
0-7 18.5 18.1 18.7 16.7 16.7 16.6
* 1971, 1975, 1980 data were converted from degrees obtained to years of education.
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), Monterey, California, 199
Table 2.2. Average Years of Education for USN Flag Officers
by Pay Grade, Selected Years, 1971-1995
Pay Grade 1971 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
0-10 16.9 17.2 18.3 16.8 17.2 17.5
0-9 17.5 18.3 18.1 16.7 17.3 18.0
0-8 17.8 19.0 18.7 16.6 17.6 17.8
0-7 18.3 18.8 19.0 16.7 17.9 17.8
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), Monterey, California, 1996.
is the result of academically accredited military courses taken in a residence or non-residence
status or through one of numerous graduate degree programs.21
Average years of service for flag and general officers further paints a picture of the
requirements involved in obtaining elite status in the naval service. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 depict
2
"These may include courses at institutions such as Command and Staff College,
Amphibious Warfare School, Naval War College, and Industrial College of the Armed Forces as
well as the Naval Postgraduate School and graduate studies at civilian universities.
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Table 2.3. Average Years of Service for USMC General Officers
by Pay Grade, Selected Years, 1971-1995
Pay Grade 1971 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
0-10 35.0 35.0 34.5 36.0 35.5 33.3
0-9 34.1 34.8 34.4 33.8 33.1 32.9
0-8 31.9 33.1 31.4 32.0 32.9 31.0
0-7 29.7 29.2 28.8 30.0 28.3 29.1
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), Monterey, California, 1996.
Table 2.4. Average Years of Service for USN Flag Officers
by Pay Grade, Selected Years, 1971-1995
Pay Grade 1971 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
10 35.1 27.2 30.1 35.6 34.6 34.1
0-9 33.1 30.8 32.5 31.1 33.4 32.8
0-8 33.0 30.4 31.6 29.1 31.9 32.2
0-7 29.8 28.7 28.7 29.5 29.4 29.4
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), Monterey, California, 1996.
the average years in service for flag and general officers by pay grade. The mean average
years of service for all flag and general pay grades combined is 30.9 years and 30.5 years,
USMC and USN, respectively. Although thirty years of service and 18 years of education
alone do not guarantee flag or general officer status, they are good descriptive tools for
viewing the composition of this elite group.
The point of reviewing some common characteristics of flag and general officers is
to gain an appreciation for the rigid structure of the naval service. Advancement through the
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ranks is not guaranteed, and obtainment of elite status is a result of many factors. Two of
these factors characterize a well-educated individual who is dedicated to spend over thirty
years in the service of his or her country. Corporate America offers many means for
advancement, but more often than not, promotions are based primarily on performance.
Typically, senior leaders in the corporate world have spent far fewer years in one
organization than have their military counterparts. If one is a proven performer, that person
can advance with little or no education after only a few years, given the right company. The
racial and ethnic composition ofthe flag and general officer corps in 1996 is the product of
commissions that occurred initially sometime before 1 966. In many ways, then, the current
flag and general officer corps can be considered racially and ethnically reflective of America
in the mid-1960s.
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 show the number of general and flag officers by racial/ethnic
group during selected years between 1971 and 1995. These tables depict just a small slice
of the last twenty-five years of racial and ethnic composition, but they do show a white-
dominated force at the senior-most levels. In 1995, the Marine Corps had only two black
general officers, both brigadier generals, representing 2.9 percent of all marines at this level.
The same year, whites accounted for 96.3 percent of all flag officers in the Navy. At the
same time, about 0.5 percent ofthese officers were American Indian, 0.5 percent were Asian,
0.9 percent were Hispanic, and 1.9 percent were black. With only a smattering of minority
general and flag officers in the years depicted, there is little question that these numbers were
not representative of society.
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Table 2.5. Number ofUSMC General Officers by Racial/Ethnic
Group and Pay Grade, Selected Years, 1971-1995



























Source: Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), Monterey, California, 1996.
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Table 2.6. Number ofUSN Flag Officers by Racial/ethnic Group
and Pay Grade, Selected Years, 1971-1995
Year Pay Grade White Black Hispanic American-
Indian
Asian















0-7 109 1 2 2
1990 10 10
0-9 27 1 1
0-8 86 1 1




0-7 101 2 2 1
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), Monterey, California, 1996.
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B. U.S. POPULATION DEMOGRAPHICS
Population demographics are an ever-changing dynamic in any nation, but in the U.S.
they inevitably have profound effects in the political realm. As ethnic and racial minority
groups in this country begin to organize and grow demographically, so does their political
power. The current U.S. population and future projections of the low, middle, and high
series are presented in Figure 2.1, covering the years 1990 to 2050. Fueling this large
population increase over the next two generations, from 1995 to 2050, are minority groups,
as seen in Table 2.7. This increase in minorities will have a great impact, not only on the
U.S. population, but also on the composition of the armed forces, assuming a continued
emphasis on racial/ethnic representation in the military.
The Bureau ofCensus divides the U.S. population into four different racial categories
and two ethnic groups. The four racial categories are: 1) American Indian, Eskimo and
Aleut ("a person having origins in any of the original peoples of North America, who
maintains cultural identification through tribal affiliation or community recognition"); 2)
Asian and Pacific Islander ("a person having origins in any of the original peoples of the Far
East, Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, or the Pacific Islands-including, for example
China, India, Japan, Korea, the Philippines Islands, and Samoa"); 3) Black ("a person
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Figure 2.1. Alternative Population Projections Using Different
Component Levels: 1990 to 2050
24
Table 2.7. Percent Distribution of the U.S. Population by Race
and Hispanic Origin, 1995 to 2050





1995 73.6 12.0 10.2 .7 3.3 100.0
2000 71.8 12.2 11.4 .7 3.9 100.0
2005 69.9 12.4 12.6 .8 4.4 100.0
2010 68.0 12.6 13.8 .8 4.8 100.0
2020 64.3 12.9 16.3 .8 5.7 100.0
2030 60.5 13.1 18.9 .8 6.6 100.0
2040 56.7 13.3 21.7 .9 7.5 100.0
2050 52.8 13.6 24.5 .9 8.2 100.0
Lowest Series
2050 55.8 14.2 22.0 1.0 7.0 100.0
Highest Series
2050 50.5 13.8 25.7 .8 9.2 100.0
Source: Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports . P25-1 130, Text Table J., p. 13.
origins in any of the original peoples of Europe, North Africa, or the Middle East"). 22
Although these racial categories do encompass a wide variety of ethnic backgrounds and
cultures, the Census Bureau has only kept records to distinguish between people of either
Hispanic origin or not of Hispanic origin, regardless of race. Therefore, the ethnic categories
documented and the choices given citizens are either "Hispanic" or not. Hispanic origin is
22Current Population Reports : Population Projections of The United States by Age, Sex,
Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1995 to 2050, U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics
Administration, Bureau of the Census, p. 25-1 130, February 1996.
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defined as "a person of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South American or other
Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race ." 23
As seen in Table 2.7, the racial composition of the United States in 1995 was as
follows: 73.6 percent white, 12 percent black, 0.7 percent American Indian, 3.3 percent
Asian, and 9 percent of Hispanic origin from all races. By the year 2050, racial and ethnic
groups will increase by the following amounts: 7.4 percent white, 69.5 percent black, 258.3
percent Hispanic, 83.0 percent American Indian, and 269.1 percent Asian. 24 Given the
lengthy service requirement of almost 30 years to reach flag or general officer, is the Navy
or Marine Corps prepared to match these racial and ethnic increases that would ensure
population representation among its senior leaders in the year 2025?
C. JUNIOR OFFICER DEMOGRAPHICS
Historically, as Table 2.8 shows, the officer corps of the Navy and Marine Corps has
not come close to being a reflection of society. As of 1995 (see Tables 2.9 and 2.10), the
officer corps is little better in reflecting the racial/ethnic diversity of society. Since the
junior officers of today will more or less reflect the flag and general officers of the future,
some concern should be given the feasibility of racial and ethnic reflectiveness. Even if the
Navy and Marine Corps successfully implement their "12-12-5" officer accession plan by
the year 2000, the flag and general officer corps will continue to be out-paced by minority
growth in society. This disproportionate relationship can be seen when comparing Tables
2.7, 2.9, and 2.10.
23
Ibid., pp. 29-31.
24Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports , p. 25-1 130, Table K.
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Table 2.8. Percent Distribution ofUSMC and USN Officers (Pay













% % % % % % #
1971 USMC 97.4 1.2 1.2 0.2 19,841
USN 98.3 0.6 0.7 0.1 0.2 70,248
1975 USMC 95.0 3.1 1.5 0.5 17,012
USN 97.2 1.4 0.9 0.5 60,146
1980 USMC 94.5 3.7 1.0 0.2 0.5 0.1 16,908
USN 95.4 2.4 0.7 0.2 0.8 0.5 59,995
1985 USMC 92.9 4.4 1.5 0.3 0.8 0.2 18,631
USN 93.4 3.2 1.4 0.2 1.4 0.4 67,271
1990 USMC 90.9 4.6 2.4 0.7 1.2 0.3 18,035
USN 91.0 3.9 2.4 0.3 2.0 0.4 69,168
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), Monterey, California, 1996.
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Table 2.9. Percent Distribution ofUSMC Officers by Racial/Ethnic
Group and Pay Grade (0-1 through 0-6), September 1995
Pay
Grade





% % % % % % #
0-1 82.3 8.1 6.4 0.3 2.3 0.6 2044
0-2 85.6 6.4 4.1 0.2 2.3 0.2 2859
0-3 89.4 4.6 3.3 0.4 1.4 0.4 5457
0-4 92.5 3.5 2.3 0.4 1.1 0.2 3161
0-5 93.1 4.5 1.5 0.3 0.6 0.1 1637
0-6 95.1 2.9 1.4 0.2 0.5 626
ALL
% 89.0 5.1 3.4 1.0 1.5 0.4 1 00.0
# 14,050 799 534 102 235 64 15,784
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), Monterey, California, 1996.
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Table 2.10. Percent Distribution of USN Officers by Racial/Ethnic
Group and Pay Grade (0-1 through 0-6), September 1995
Pay White Black Hispanic American Asian- Other Total
Grade Indian Pacific
Islander
% % % % % % #
0-1 80.6 8.5 5.5 0.6 4.2 0.6 6,391
0-2 84.4 6.7 4.3 0.5 3.8 0.4 7,162
0-3 86.9 5.6 3.7 0.3 3.2 0.4 21,056
0-4 90.4 4.1 2.7 0.4 2.3 0.9 11,189
0-5 92.8 3.3 1.5 0.4 1.9 0.1 7,084
0-6 95.3 2.1 0.9 0.3 1.3 0.1 3,314
ALL
%* 87.8 5.3 3.3 .4 2.9 0.3 100.0
# 49,328 2,967 1,862 215 1,640 184 56,196
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), Monterey, California, 1996.
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Representation seems a distant goal after comparing current minority percentages in
the general and flag officer corps with those in the U.S. population. Based on the Bureau of
Census minority population projections, a representative officer corps or flag and general
officer corps seems an unlikely prospect for the future, given the "12-12-5 Plan." If a
racially or ethnically representative officer corps is so unlikely in the relatively near term,
one must ask: is representation something the naval service should be striving toward?
The goal of minority representation in the officer corps has its proponents and
opponents in the senior ranks of the naval service. Based on a series of interviews with flag
and general officers, there seem to be three schools of thought: those who support the
idealistic view of equal representation, but without special programs for accession or
promotion; those with an idealistic view who support special programs for accession and
promotion; and those who do not believe in any special programs based on race/ethnicity,
but only on a "best qualified" rule.
A recently retired Rear Admiral captured best the view of interviewees who support
a policy of racial/ethnic representation:
Racial and ethnic representation.... Ideally, yes. Getting there requires a
dedicated effort in recruiting, officer accession programs, career development
programs, and attention to the issue in advancement and promotion selection
processes. The Armed Forces (nothing unique about the Naval Services),
like it or not, are role models for our society. It is not good enough to mirror
society. They must be in the lead in social reform and equality for all
citizens. Therefore, the demographics ofthe population ofthe Armed Forces,
in striving for proportionate representation across the board, must run ahead
ofindustry and corporate America in near-term achievement ofrepresentation
closer to the total proportionate numbers. While, on an individual basis,
"best qualified" must be a basic yard stick for selection in each step of a
career, it is incumbent on the Armed Forces to have programs and initiatives
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in place that ensure the yard stick can be met with appropriate minority
representation. 25
Proponents of racial and ethnic representation in the military, as stated above, seem
at ease with the idea of quotas or goals in commissioning as well as in promotions. This
seems difficult to balance with the concept of "best qualified" if that is to be the yard stick.
"Best qualified" implies that no distinction is made between racial, ethnic, gender, or social
status; selection is, in fact, conducted on a "best qualified" basis. Other interviewees who
supported equal representation did not advocate any social programs to promote officers
once commissioned. Instead, these proponents of equal representation seemed to advocate
attempting to commission an officer corps racially and ethnically reflective of society, while
leaving promotions to "best qualified" advancement. These interviewees seemed to
emphasize the importance of equal opportunity, without lowering standards, as a means to
achieve a representative force.
Opponents of equal representation in the Naval Service tend to argue as follows:
I strongly believe that recruitment of both officers and enlisted personnel
should be based entirely on the traditional factors of 'best qualified,' and
'suitability for service.' If any other factors are used—quota setting, for
example —the results would be denial of service opportunities for well
qualified individuals. This would be a disservice to both the military and to
the eligible recruits. It would inevitably lead to a similar quota system for
promotions, for special details, and for school selections, thereby breaking
the Navy/Marine Corps into an aggregation of cliques made up of the racial
"Information and quotes are from interviews with retired and active duty flag and general
officers. See Appendix.
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or ethnic backgrounds of their members. Instead, all selections should be for
merit alone, and should not be influenced by any other factors. 26
As of 1996, the Navy and Marine Corps had no formal quotas for racial or ethnic
minorities in officer recruiting. Instead, the naval service uses minority goals, currently "12-
12-5," for recruiting officers, but not in promotions. Officer selection officers (OSOs) who
are often under pressure to meet minority goals , however, are likely to perceive little
difference between a goal and a quota. It seems safe to assume that, if the naval service has
almost doubled the minority goals in the last several years, there is a growing emphasis on
developing a more diverse officer corps. With goal obtainment pressure, however, it seems
important to ensure quality is not sacrificed with increased minority commissions. And, as
proportionately more minorities join the junior officer corps, will they continue through
thirty years of service, under a "best qualified" system, and rise to flag or general officer
rank?
26Flag and general officer interviews, Appendix.
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III. MILITARY EXPERIENCE IN SOCIETY
Under Article I, Section 8 ofthe Constitution, authority is given to Congress to "raise
and support armies... [t]o provide and maintain a Navy [and] to make rules for the
government and regulation of the land and naval forces." However, we also expect the
military to maintain some professional autonomy while remaining politically neutral. One
of the reasons this delicate relationship has survived is due to an appreciation and
understanding of the military by our government leaders. Understanding of military matters
has traditionally come from personal experience in the armed forces or, at least, through a
dedicated study of military affairs. If military experience through service declines among
our elected officials, will military issues and legislation receive less attention from those
same elected officials? One study has linked the veteran status of Congressional members
to their voting behavior in defense-related legislation.27 This raises an important question:
does the veteran status of our elected officials help or hinder their relationship with our elite
military leaders?
This chapter explores the possible effect that military experience may have on the
relationship between elite naval leaders and elected officials. A divide between elected
officials and the flag and general officer corps may, indeed, result from a lack of knowledge
among the elected officials regarding military matters. This chapter examines literature on
the past voting behavior of veterans in Congress and military issues taken on by a President
without military experience. An analysis of Congressional voting behavior is followed by
27Roger D. Little, "Senate Military Veterans Voting on Defense Issues, 1983-90" (paper
presented at the biennial conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society,
Baltimore, Maryland, October 1993).
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a review of the debates surrounding gays in the military and readiness versus modernization
of the naval service. These debates between the President, Congress, and the leadership of
the naval service may highlight a growing gap in civil-military relations.
A. LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
Members of Congress who served in the armed forces during World War II and
Korea are now being replaced by a younger generation of legislators who tend to have had
no military service.28 Veterans of Vietnam or, more recently the Gulf War, now comprise
only a small percentage ofthe population eligible to serve in Congress or as president. The
portion of American men who have served in the military has also been in steady decline
since the force drawdowns after the Vietnam War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. At
the same time, several studies have linked the military experience of Congressional members
to their voting behavior on defense-related matters.29
In a December 12, 1994 Navy Times article, Rick Maze observed that just 54 senators
and 157 representatives were veterans in the 104th Congress, six fewer senators and 21 fewer
representatives than in the 103rd Congress. In a November 25, 1996 Navy Times article,
Rick Maze further observed that only 48 senators and 138 representatives will be veterans
when the 105th Congress opens in January 1997. 30
28
Ibid.,p. 1.
29See Mark J. Eitelberg and Roger D. Little, "Influential Elites and the American Military
after the Cold War," in U.S. Civil-Military Relations In Crisis or Transition?, edited by Don M.
Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew, The Center for Strategic & International Studies,
Washington, D.C., 1994, p. 53.
30Rick Maze, "Fewer Veterans in Congress," and "New Congress Will Have Fewer
Veterans," Navy Times, December 12, 1994, p. 12, and November 25, 1996, p. 1, respectively.
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Actually, a steady decline in elected officials with military experience has been
occurring since the 98th Congress. Table 3.1 compares levels of military experience among
members of the Senate and House of Representatives, from the 98th Congress to the 103d. 31
The House of Representatives has seen a 27 percent decrease in members with military
experience between 1983 and 1992. During the same time frame, the level of military
experience among senators has decreased by 23 percent. The cumulative decrease between
1983 and 1992 among members of Congress with military experience has been 27 percent.
Table 3.1. Percentage of Members of Congress with Military
Experience, by Session, Legislative Body, and Type of
Service
Session of House Senate Total
Congress







98th 50.5 56.8 63.4 76.2 52.9 60.5
99th 46.9 52.9 61.4 75.2 49.6 57.1
100th 44.5 50.2 55.4 69.3 46.6 53.8
101st 39.2 48.4 56.4 69.3 42.4 52.3
102d 42.8 48.0 55.9 69.6 45.3 52.0
103d 34.0 40.5 49.0 58.8 36.9 43.9
Source: Derived from information contained in LEGI-SLATE data files. Published in U.S. Civil-
Military Relations: In Crisis or Transition?, p. 54.
In analyzing Congressional voting behavior, a 10-year study was conducted using 50
key defense-related votes. This study, as documented in U.S. Civil-Militarv Relations: In
31
Ibid., Table 3.2, pp. 54.
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Crisis or Transition?, analyzed the period that covers the 98th (1983-1984) through 102d
(1991-1992) Congresses (see Tables 3.2, and 3.3).32 Veteran status for members of Congress
was defined as those who had served in the military, active or reserve, regardless of whether
veterans benefits were earned.
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 depict the voting behavior ofmembers of the Senate and House
of Representatives, respectively, broken down by age cohort and veteran or nonveteran
status. The age cohorts were determined in a general fashion to distinguish between
members of Congress who were eligible for service in World War II (Oldest), Vietnam
(Middle), and Post-Vietnam generations (Youngest). Reading across the rows of each age
cohort—comparing veteran and nonveteran votes on pro-defense-related legislation—veterans,
regardless of age cohort, have overwhelmingly voted pro-defense. Senate voting among
veterans from 1982 through 1993, in the middle age group, was 8.6 percent higher for pro-
defense legislation than among nonveterans in the same age group. Pro-defense voting in
the House of Representatives "...strengthens as the groups get older (and perhaps more
conservative, in general) reaching a level of 56 to 57 percent, in contrast to about 53 percent
for the youngest cohort."33 Conclusions drawn from this study imply stronger defense voting
among veteran members of Congress; however, as the authors admit, "[v]oting analysis is,








Table 3.2. U.S. Senate Voting Behavior on Pro-Defense Legislation,
by Session, Birth Cohort, and Veteran Status
Total Votes Possible Percent Votes Pro-Defense




407 376 326 274 333 1,716 56.3 58.0 45.7 55.8 43.2 52.0
Nonveteran 60 48 38 30 28 204 55.0 56.3 39.5 36.7 39.3 47.5
Veteran 347 328 288 244 235 1,442 56.5 58.2 46.5 58.2 56.6 55.2
Middle
(1928-43 496 526 563 649 622 2,856 57.1 61.2 60.4 62.6 65.3 61.5
Nonveteran 156 168 223 258 252 1,057 41.0 51.2 57.0 57.8 66.3 56.1
Veteran 340 358 340 391 370 1,799 64.4 65.9 62.6 65.7 64.6 64.7
Youneest
(after 1943) 38 50 85 60 78 311 76.3 66.0 56.5 48.3 55.1 58.5
Nonveteran 9 10 37 20 29 105 100.0 100.0 64.9 40.0 51.7 62.9
Veteran 29 40 48 40 49 206 69.0 57.5 50.0 52.5 57.1 56.3
Source: Derived from information contained in LEGI-SLATE data files. Published in U.S.
Civil-Military Relations: In Crisis or Transition?, p. 61.
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Table 3.3. House of Representatives Voting Behavior on Pro-Defense
Legislation, by Session, Birth Cohort, and Veteran Status
Total Votes Possible Percent Votes Pro-Defense




952 1001 961 964 940 4,818 53.8 52.2 54.8 56.8 66.8 56.8
Nonveteran 197 195 202 208 169 971 53.3 53.8 55.4 55.8 71.0 57.5
Veteran 755 806 759 756 771 3,847 53.9 51.9 54.7 57.1 65.9 56.7
Middle
(1928-43) 2,257 2,230 2,228 2,180 2,219 11,114 52.9 50.7 54.2 54.9 66.0 55.7
Nonveteran 1,059 1,085 982 923 949 4,996 50.2 49.3 51.7 50.8 62.0 52.8
Veteran 1,198 1,145 1,246 1,257 1,270 6,116 55.2 52.0 56.2 57.9 68.4 58.1
Youngest
(after 1943) 963 966 961 1,050 991 4,931 50.2 49.0 50.7 52.7 61.5 52.8
Nonveteran 730 759 734 808 775 3,806 47.9 46.9 48.9 50.0 59.9 50.8
Veteran 233 207 227 242 216 1,125 57.1 56.5 56.4 61.6 67.1 59.7
Source: Derived from information contained in LEGI-SLATE data files. Published in U.S. Civil-
Military Relations: In Crisis or Transition?, p. 62.
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Defense-related legislation in the House and Senate is typically deliberated and
refined in one of several subcommittees. Subcommittees are created to focus on a variety
of topics, and they are the deliberating bodies where most the work on legislation is done.
For example, the Senate Armed Services Committee deals with defense legislation; but, this
work is divided initially among a variety of subcommittees such as the Subcommittee on
Personnel, the Subcommittee on Seapower, and the Subcommittee on Readiness. The
veteran status of the members of these subcommittees should be seen as critical in shaping
defense-related legislation before it comes to a vote in the main bodies of Congress. In the
1 04th Congress, most members of these three Senate subcommittees had some military
experience. In fact, four of six members of the Subcommittees on Personnel and Seapower,
and eight of nine members of the Subcommittee on Readiness had served in the military. 35
Military experience in key legislative positions such as these may help to reduce possible
isolation from occurring between elected officials and the senior leaders of the Naval
Service.
35In 1996, the members and military experience of the Senate Armed Services
subcommittees were as follows: Subcommittee on Personnel; Daniel R. Coats, (R)-IN, Army, 1966-
1968., John McCain (R)-AZ, Navy, 1958-1981, Richard J. Santorum, (R)-PA, no military service,
Robert C. Byrd (D)-WV, no military experience, Edward M. Kennedy, (D)-MA, Army, 195 1-1953,
Charles Robb (D)-VA, Marine Corps, 1961-1970. Subcommittee on Seapower; William S. Cohen,
(R)-ME, no military experience, John W. Warner, (R)-VA, John McCain (R)-AZ, Navy, 1958-1981,
Robert C. Smith, (R)-NH, Navy, 1965-1967., Edward M. Kennedy, (D)-MA, Army, 1951-1953., J.
James Exon, (D)-NE, Army Reserves, 1945-1949, Charles Robb (D)-VA, Marine Corps, 1961-1970,
Joseph Lieberman (D)-CT, no military experience. Subcommittee on Readiness; John McCain (R)-
AZ, Navy, 1958-1981, William S. Cohen, (R)-ME, no military experience, Daniel R Coats, (R)-IN,
Army 1966-1968, James M. Inhofe (R)-OK, Army, 1954-1956, Richard J. Santorum (R)-PA, no
military experience, John H. Glenn, (D)-OH, Marine Corps 1942-1965, Jeff Bingaman, (D)-NM,
Army Reserves, 1968-1974, Charles Robb, (D)-VA, Marine Corps, 1961-1970, Richard H. Bryan,
(D)-NV, Army 1959-1960. Data provided in Congressional Biographical Records, as compiled in
LEXIS-NEXIS, 1996.
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The issue of military experience among members of the Executive and Legislative
Branches was discussed with general and flag officers. A variety ofopinions were expressed
by the interviewees. When asked if it was important for the president and members of
Congress to have some military experience, flag and general officers responded in the
following manner:36
Yes, for a better understanding ofthe importance of a strong military and so
that the benefits we once thought we had will be put back rather than
continually eroded away.
The fate of the military is in civilian hands.... Compare 1960 in Vietnam,
when military voices were ignored and the Persian Gulf War, when military
experience in the White House was predominate; 55,000 killed in Vietnam,
and only a few hundred casualties in the Persian Gulf.
Yes, it is important because one should understand what it means to commit
our people to combat.
Military service is not a necessary factor in making informed judgments on
military matters; however, it helps to know a bit about the subject before
rendering decisions that affect the country's future safety. Military service
is important in our system ofgovernment because a democracy is directed by
the majority of its member—in our system, the civilians elected to office. If
those elected members, both in the executive and legislative branches, who
are in the majority have little knowledge of the military, they might not be as
well-informed as they should be in making decisions on the use of the
nations 's military power in international crises.
It is not essential for the president, although it is important that the president,
members of Congress and key civilian members of the Defense Department
be knowledgeable about military affairs. The key is that they are prepared to
view military service with respect and not disdain.
36The Appendix shows the number of flag and general officers interviewed. The interview
protocol is also presented here.
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Flag and general officers in the sample were also asked whether they thought that
members of Congress are becoming less knowledgeable in military matters. The
interviewees offered two basic views, paraphrased as follows:
1. Yes--but...
We professional military people certainly have an understandable bias toward
people who have some experience and personal knowledge of our profession.
There is a perception that veterans in elective office will provide for our
needs better than those without that background. So I would easily answer
this in the affirmative. However, as a taxpaying citizen I believe that a
military background for elected officials is only in the "desirable" category
and not essential. What is important is to elect officials who are honest,
intelligent, and unbiased in their views on the maintenance and use of
military in the national interest, and who are able to deal with the issues
involving the Armed Services in a rational and balanced manner. In this era
of the All-Volunteer military, which means a higher percentage of career
military, without major conflict to require huge standing forces, it is
statistically impossible to expect that very many elected national officials will
have a military background.
2. Yes—and ...
Without a doubt, there is less knowledge of military subjects in Congress
than in times past. This is, in part, because of the lack of military service of
many members of Congress, and, in part, by their consequent lack of interest
in things military; but primarily by the fact that there has been a great influx
ofyoung congressmen (and women) with no experience in dealing with the
military services. The older, more senior members, have served long enough
to have experienced knowledgeable military testimony, visits to military
commands, and other exposures to military matters. The lack of knowledge
of the majority ofnew congressional members can only adversely affect the
relationship between Congress and senior military officers as they interact.
A retired admiral shared a dated, but telling anecdotal experience on the issue of
"military literacy" in Congress:
41
I once was the neighbor of a member of Congress—not a good friend, but a
speaking acquaintance. He approached me one day while I was mowing my
lawn, and asked my opinion on the development of the AEGIS system. I
responded enthusiastically that it was the most important new weapons
development in the Navy, and proceeded to explain the technical and military
reasons for my opinion. After hearing me out, Congressman X. Said: 'Well,
I guess I should have talked to you before I spoke on the floor and
recommended the cancellation ofAEGIS.' I agreed that he should have. Our
relationship was not improved, but I believe he became much more
knowledgeable on that subject.
Examples and opinions such as these suggest that relations between senior military
leaders and elected officials are becoming separated or somewhat strained. An example of
this type of strain or isolation is more pointedly seen in the debate that took place during
1993 when President Clinton attempted to lift the ban on gays in the military.
B. EXECUTIVE BRANCH
On January 29, 1993, the President directed me to review DoD policy on
homosexuals in the military. The President further directed that the DoD
policy be 'practical, realistic, and consistent with the high standards of
combat effectiveness and unit cohesion our armed forces must maintain.' 37
This was extracted from a memo sent by Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, to the service
secretaries and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Thus, President Clinton
began his push to change military policy as his first executive priority, fulfilling his
campaign promise to gay interest groups. For a President who once avoided military service
and was already viewed with some distrust by those who chose to serve, a backlash of
37Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff. Subject: Policy on Homosexual Conduct in the Armed Forces, by Les Aspin, July 19, 1993.
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reactions from the military establishment seemed inevitable. President Clinton's lack of
military service has been highlighted among veterans groups, political opponents, and a
substantial portion of the voting public, as published in several polls taken at the time. The
extent of this isolation was well-voiced by Eitelberg and Little in "Influential Elites and the
American Military after the Cold War:"
By March 1993, interviews and polls with officers, enlisted personnel, and
veterans pinpointed five main areas of concern: the president's avoidance of
the Vietnam War; his attempt to lift the ban on homosexuals; fears about his
scheme to cut the defense budget; resentment over a Clinton administration
proposal to freeze military pay; and 'the prevalent view that Mr. Clinton and
his staff neither understand military life nor like military people.' 38
Each of these five topics may have further added to tensions between the
administration and flag and general officers, but no issue contrasted a President against the
military elite more than the issue of homosexuals in the military. Flag and general officers
interviewed for the study consistently cited this issue as a primary argument for preferring
the commander and chief of the military to have military experience. Virtually all
interviewees also observed that the homosexual issue had heightened tensions and
diminished the rapport between military leaders and the president.
According to the General Accounting Office, the military had dismissed 1,500
service members a year for homosexuality between fiscal years 1980 and 1990. "Although
38Mark J Eitelberg, and Roger D. Little, "Influential Elites and the American Military after
the Cold War," in U.S. Civil-Militarv Relations In Crisis or Transition?, edited by Don M. Snider
and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington D.C.,
1994, p. 49.
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the Navy represented only 27 percent of the total active-duty personnel in that 11 -year
period, it accounted for 51 percent of dismissals on grounds of homosexuality. ..and the
Marine Corps, 9 percent of the total and 6 percent of dismissals."39 These high numbers for
the Navy and Marine Corps reflect the awareness and sensitivity to the issue among senior
military leaders. The Department of Defense responded to the Government Accounting
Office numbers when questioned by Congressional Quarterly magazine, saying: "Due to
the Navy life at sea during extended deployments, identification of homosexuals may well
occur more often than in the other services."40
Over 2,300 active duty enlisted personnel on 38 military bases were polled by the Los
Angeles Times in the second week of February 1993. An overwhelming majority of these
personnel disapproved President Clinton's plan to lift the ban on homosexuals in the
military. Figure 3.1 depicts the extent of disapproval, approval, and "don't know" responses
in the poll.
Following Governor Clinton's election victory in November 1992, a typically
obedient military establishment began to publicly voice opinions about the President's
campaign promises of lifting the ban on homosexuals in the military.
'I can't remember any time when there was open hostility like this between
a commander in chief and the military,' said Martin Binkin, a military
manpower specialist for The Brookings Institution, a moderate think tank
here. Clinton determination to lift the gay ban despite strong opposition from
39Pat Towell and Carroll J. Doherty "Fireworks Over Ban on Gays Temporarily Snuffed








the military's top officers could make relations between the president and his
troops very difficult, Binkin said, especially since Clinton comes to the
commander in chief s job with 'other baggage.' 41
Source: Melissa Healy, "74% of Military Enlistees Oppose Lifting Gay
Ban," Los Angeles Times, February 28, 1993, p. A23.
Figure 3.1. Los Angeles Times Poll: A Closer Look at Who Opposes
Lifting Ban
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, was especially
vocal in his opposition to the new President's proposal, as Kohn observes:
41William Mathews, "Angry voices batter Clinton's action," Navy Times, February 8, 1993.
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General Colin Powell must have felt very strongly indeed on this subject, for
he virtually defied the President-elect, never denying publicly the rumors in
November-December 1992 that he might resign over the issue, doing nothing
to scotch rumors that his fellow chiefs might do the same, doing nothing to
discourage retired generals from lobbying on Capitol Hill to form an alliance
against lifting the ban.42
Whether lifting the ban was right or wrong, the president was proposing to break
military tradition, and he apparently ignored the advice of his senior-most military leaders.
In fairness to President-elect Clinton, he did appoint John Holum, a Washington-based
lawyer to investigate the effects of lifting the ban. "Holum,...who was Clinton's key
transition aide on the military gay issue, held 'over 40 meetings with representatives of the
military' during the transition period, White House spokesman George Stephanopoulos said
Jan. 27.
"
43 The result of these meetings persuaded President Clinton "...not to issue an
executive order ending the military's gay ban during his first week in office."44 Would a
President with military experience have needed three months of research from a lawyer to
decide it was a bad idea to issue an executive order the first week of an administration over
such a controversial issue? Many comparisons were made in the National media, comparing
this issue with President Truman's Executive Order 9981, which ended racial segregation
in the military. However,
42Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," National
Interest, No. 35, Spring 1994, p. 13.
43Grant Willis, "Clinton's decision: No rush job," Navy Times, February 8, 1993.
"Ibid.
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even President Truman did not attempt to approach the controversial issue of racial
integration in such an ill-guided manner. 45
C. READINESS VERSUS MODERNIZATION
Early in 1996, a debate began between the Republican-controlled Congress, top
military officials, and the Clinton Administration over recapitalization ofmilitary equipment-
-readiness versus modernization. This debate began as Admiral Owens, Chairman, JCS,
Joint Requirements Oversight Council, advised General Shalikashvi, Chairman, JCS, based
on reports from global military commanders, that the military should begin a recapitalization
ofmajor programs beginning in fiscal year 1 997.* If this were to be the case, then the senior
leadership of the armed services would have to gain political support in Congress to counter
President Clinton's proposals for a declining defense budget.
45President Truman's decision to sign Executive Order 9981 in 1948 was preceded by more
than two years of debate among senior military officials, Congress, and the president. Congress had
introduced the Universal Military Training Bill in 1947, which many members of Congress
attempted to use to pass a desegregation bill. President Truman appointed his own committee on
civil rights in 1947. Recommendations of this committee, on 29 October 1947, condemned
segregation wherever it existed, but President Truman waited until the 26th of July, 1948 to issue
his Executive Order. Even with the issuance of this order, it took the action of the Fahy Committee
to ensure the desegregation of the military was carried out. It wasn't until 1954 that the Armed
Forces were formally declared fully "integrated" by the Department of Defense. The prolonged
actions surrounding desegregation of the military stand in sharp contrast to the lightning fashion the
Clinton Administration attempted to lift the ban on homosexuals in the military. See William C.
Berman, The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration . Ohio State University Press,
1970., Morris J. MacGregor, Jr., Integration Of The Armed Forces 1940-1965 . Center of Military
History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., 1981, and Richard M. Dalfiume, Desegregation of
the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts . 1939-1953, University of Missouri Press,
Columbia, Missouri, 1969, for more information.
46Rowan Scarborough, "Shalikashvili lost battle to raise spending for new weapons now,"
Washington Times, March 8, 1996, pp. 1.
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The 1997 defense budget projects a continuing dip in procurement from $42
billion to $39 billion—the least since the early 1950s, adjusted for inflation.
It puts off the $60 billion target until 2001, three years later than the Joint
Chiefs recommended. "This is a major schism between our top military
officers and the White House,' a defense official said.47
Positions on defense modernization or readiness are not necessarily described as
having to do with military experience. Instead, this issue plays more to the hands of politics,
finance, and defense industry lobbying. Despite the many undercurrent powers pushing for
readiness or modernizations, a break in civil-military relations is highlighted by persistent
confrontations between the White House and the senior military leaders over defense issues.
The focus ofthe White House on readiness places its highest priority on fully funding
operational and maintenance budgets to maintain current readiness ofU.S. forces. This focus
also provides for a 3 percent pay raise in the 1997 budget and also adds money for housing,
child care, and "quality of life" programs. In all, the White House defense budget for 1997
is a 6 percent drop from the budget of the previous year.
This is in contrast to the JCS recommendation to Congress to increase the defense
appropriations budget by 60 billion dollars for modernization. Modernization of the force
consists of ensuring platforms such as 40-year-old airframes, aging amphibious fleets, and
outdated communications equipment are replaced to keep the military on the cutting edge
of technology. David C. Morrison, in an article published in National Journal, summarized
why modernization is such a priority in the 1990s. "Our most serious [threats]," Morris
observed:
47Scarborough, Washington Times, p. 1
.
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...will come down the road rather than tomorrow morning. Because, the
worst thing we have to worry about tomorrow morning is North Korea or
Iraq, which are not the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan. But
1 5 years down the road, we could face something like those powers—China,
perhaps.48
All of the senior military leaders have spoken openly, not only before Congress, but to the
press as well, concerning the necessity to maintain modernization programs. For example,
in 1995, the outgoing Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., said,
...the Corps is not hollow, but shallow. Short-term readiness is being
maintained, ...but I remain concerned about the not-so-distant implications
of continuing to defer needed investment in the Marine Corps of the future.49
An article in the Washington Post further echoed concerns of a group of retired four-
star officers:
...[who said] in a recent report to Congress that the administration was
'failing utterly' to invest adequately in the nation's military future. 'Our
legacy to the next generation is likely to be 45-year-old training aircraft, 35-
year-old bombers and airlifters, 25-year-old fighters, 35-year-old trucks and
40-year-old medium lift helicopters,' said the report by Air Force Gen.
Charles A. Gabriel, Marine Gen. Alfred M. Gray, Adm. Carlisle A.H. Trost
and Army Gen. Robert W. RisCassi. 50
Whether this debate began and ended as a political "turf war" or not, this is another
instance of the senior military leadership of the services speaking out against elected
48David C. Morrison, "Ready for What?," National Journal, March 20, 1995, p. 1219.
49Ibid,p. 1220.
50Bradley Grahm, "Clinton Administration Trades Military Modernization for Readiness,'
Washington Post, May 19, 1995, p. A20.
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officials. In American democracy, the military has been placed subordinate to its civilian
leadership. In politics, the military leaders are supposed to remain neutral, while still voicing
necessary opinions when requested to do so by the president or Congress. A point of excess
is difficult to identify in this realm, but it seems that the military leaders of today are being
drawn into the political process more and more. If persons without military experience
continue to be elected to public office, will this further draw upon military leaders to
politically defend what they see as best, militarily, for the U.S.? Or, does this further
exacerbate tension and isolation between elected officials and senior military leaders?
50
IV. VALUES
A. VALUES IN SOCIETY
In our society, the businessman may command more income; the politician
may command more power; but the professional man commands more
respect. Yet the public, as well as the scholar, hardly conceives of the officer
in the same way that it does the lawyer or doctor, and it certainly does not
accord to the officer the deference which it gives to the civilian
professionals. 51
This 1959 excerpt from Samuel Huntington's The Soldier And The State describes
American society's view of the professional officer. While this deference toward civilian
professionals may still exist today, military professionals have made tremendous strides
toward gaining professional respect among civilians. 52 Gaining professional competence and
respect, however, has not undermined the continued emphasis on tradition and values among
flag and general officers. In fact, the further professionalization of the officer corps may
have enhanced some fundamental differences in values between the miliary and civilian
society. If a different set of values has developed in the military—particularly among flag
and general officers—has it been a unique case of military socialization? If so, has this
resulted in tension between elected officials and flag and general officers?
5
'Samuel Huntington, The Soldier And The State . Belknap Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
1959, pp. 7.
52The armed forces have more rigidly enforced education and training standards within the
officer corps to produce a more professional force. An all-volunteer force has also be instituted
helping to create a more professional organization.
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In answering these questions, this chapter addresses possible tension in civil-military
relations resulting from varying emphasis being placed on certain core values. This is done
by first establishing a common set of values between flag and general officers and elected
officials. The socialization processes in the military and among elected officials are then
examined. Next, interviews with flag and general officers are reviewed to identify any
tension between this group and elected officials based on values.
Four principal values were identified in the course ofthe study: Personal Values, such
as honesty, loyalty, responsibility, and leadership; Social Values, including social responsi-
bility, equality, justice, liberty, religion, community, and pride in country; Political Values,
such as civic responsibility, voting, rights versus expediency, public service, the "American
Way"; and Moral Values, such as self responsibility, fairness, value basis, example, and
lifestyle. These four values represent what might be considered a core set of values in
society. Indeed, there are several different types of values, and varying degrees of
importance are placed on each of these values by individuals and institutions. In developing
a base-line to understand values, values are defined as: "[a]n individual's or group's ideas
about the worth or importance of people, things, and concepts;" or an "abstract concept of
what is right, worthwhile, or desirable; principles or standards."53
Values held by society or by elected officials and military leaders are an important
aspect of civil-military relations. The four values used in this study help identify aspects of
individual beliefs that further affect attitudes and behavior. From a value base, individuals
"Leadership, p. 2-A- 1
.
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develop attitudes; and, from these attitudes, behavior is exhibited. Therefore, the
significance placed on values are reflected through attitudes and behavior, as projected in a
person's character.
For example, suppose an employer's personal value for punctuality is very high. If
the employer has two employees who are very similar in their personal make-up, except that
one is punctual and the other is always late, he or she will probably have a better attitude
toward the one who is punctual. In this case, the employer's values have influenced his or
her attitude. A resulting behavior from this attitude might be assigning a major project to the
punctual individual over the one who is always late.
In value development, values that are emphasized for elected officials might not have
much importance among military leaders. These values may also be developed in
completely separate institutional settings. Therefore, as seen in the above example, the
significance placed on certain values can easily have a considerable, perhaps subconscious,
impact on attitudes and behavior.
Attempting to identify and describe values that have greater emphasis among elected
officials than military leaders is no easy feat. Each group and individual may stress one
value over another, and by the time all these levels of significance were compiled and
quantified, the quality ofthis data could become obsolete. Nevertheless, if attempted, a more
precise view of military values, or a "military mind," might be possible in characterizing the
officer corps than in identifying a "civilian mind." As Samuel Huntington has observed:
Just as there is a variety of civilian groups engaged in the struggle for power,
so also is there a variety of civilian ethics or ideologies. Consequently, it is
53
impossible to assume a continuum stretching from military values at one end
to civilian values at the other. The military ethic is concrete, permanent, and
universal. The term 'civilian,' on the other hand, merely refers to what is
nonmilitary. No dichotomy exists between the 'military mind' and the
'civilian mind,' because there is no single 'civilian mind.' There are many
'civilian minds,' and the difference between any two civilian ethics may be
greater than the difference between any one of them and the military ethic. 54
B. SOCIALIZATION
One approach in defining military values is to identify their source. Values exhibited
through attitudes and behavior by general and flag officers may be considered "military" in
nature, thus representing a "military mind." However, as Samuel Huntington points out:
...everything which comes from a military source does not necessarily derive
from its character as a military source. Military men are also Frenchmen and
Americans, Methodists and Catholics, liberals and reactionaries, Jews and
antisemites. 55
Huntington suggests that this problem of multiple affiliations might be overcome if a broad
enough sample of military men were selected for study. In analyzing and quantifying a
"military mind," based on a commonly-defined set of values, I have examined the
socialization process of flag and general officers in the naval service.
Flag and general officers have chosen to dedicate their professional working lives in
service to the nation. In so doing, these professionals have upheld, undertaken, and
developed a unique set of military traditions and values. For example, the Marine Corps
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places heavy emphasis on tradition in values, as conveyed by the Commandant of the Marine
Corps, General Charles Krulak:
Tradition is not something that can be simply written down and filed away
for another day. It cannot be reduced to regulations, manuals, or bits and
bytes of data. Tradition embodies the values that can never be replaced by
the cold precision ofmachines and electrons. Tradition is that essence of the
human spirit which is passed on as one person looks another in the eyes and
gives an encouraging slap on the shoulder for doing a task the 'Marine' way.
It is the sum total ofMarine Corps culture that is passes from one generation
to the next, in countless scenes across the Corps, as morning coffee is
brewed, or evening chow is shared, or a column halts along a dusty road. 56
Recently, starting in 1 994, the Marine Corps has renewed its campaign to place a set
of core values at the forefront of training and education. The tenets of these personal values
are honor, courage, and commitment. This focus on values at the forefront of training and
education continued into 1995, with the recruit depots at both San Diego and Parris Island
adding a 20-hour core values package to their recruit training syllabus. Even the professional
magazine of the Marine Corps, Marine Corps Gazette, has continued to run stories on the
development of core values. In 1996, three such articles~"Instilling Marine Values," "The
Core Values Issue," and "A Proposed code of Leadership and Ethics for Marines"~appeared
in this professional journal. 57
"General Charles Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps, Message on Values, "The
Marine Corps: The Best of America's Values," as published on the U.S. Marine Corps Internet
homepage, 1996.
"These first two articles appeared in the September 1996 issue ofthe Marine Corps Gazette,
pp. 54-57, and p. 58, respectively. The third article appeared in the June 1996 issue, pp. 41-44.
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On the 19th of October, 1994, a group of approximately twelve active duty general
officers met in Quantico, Virginia, at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command to
discuss a "Vision for the Marine Corps." In this process, the group defined what they
considered to be the "uniqueness" of the Marine Corps. A portion of their discussion took
the form of Figure 4.1. As seen in this figure, a set of core values is a central off-shoot to
what this group of general officers described as the character of the Marine Corps.
Source: Tapped panel discussion, "Core Values," Vision For The Marine Corps, General Officer
working group, Marine Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA, October 19,
1994.
Figure 4.1. U.S. Marine Corps, Character Development
Marines are also trained and educated in a regimented fashion that further reinforces
and develops core values. Officers follow a prescribed set of requirements for advancement
and education, from commissioning sources through The Basic School—which all officers
attend—to later schooling in selected specialties. The regimentation of advancement is
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standardized for a fair and equitable promotion system. In all, the process of socialization
in the Marine Corps seems to greatly influence the emphasis placed on a core set of values.
The Navy, much like the Marine Corps, has a very systematic organizational
methodology for advancement and education. Officers and enlisted personnel are trained in
specialty schools for their career fields and are advanced on the basis of performance, time
in service, and education, to name a few. During this process of advancement in the Navy,
officers, as well as enlisted personnel are exposed to the Navy's core values—honor, courage,
commitment. These core values are an integral part of service life, education, and culture.
An example of the extent and even renewed emphasis on these core values is seen in
the Navy's recruit training. A 1996 article in the Navy Times discusses the importance of
instilling values in new recruits:
This is not your father's boot camp. In fact, this is not your boot camp either.
This really, truly is a kinder, gentler boot camp, reformed for a new
generation of recruits who might not be as tough—or as well grounded in
basic values—as recruits of yesteryear.... Recruits no longer drill with rifles
and no longer salute their seniors in the enlisted ranks. Threats give way to
exhortation. Explanations are not unheard of. And the words honor, courage
and commit-ment—the Navy's core values—are drummed into recruits at
every turn.... Boot camp today isn't just a place where recruits learn the Navy
way of doing things. Rather, say training specialists here, it's the starting
point for instilling in your men and women the sense of personal
responsibility they'll need to be successful sailors. Trainers say too many
recruits never developed that sense growing up—not at home, in school or
even in church. So these days, values training is part of virtually every step
in the process of turning civilians into sailors. 58
58John Burlage, "Has Great Lakes gone too soft on recruits?," Navy Times, October 28, 1996,
pp. 12-14.
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This new, or renewed, emphasis on core values is not isolated to recruit training, but has
penetrated every rank and school in the Navy culture.
Since individual values are the product of experiences gained through affiliations
with one's family and institutions, socialization is the process by which we develop values.
Important institutions in the socialization of values include: elementary school, middle
school, high school, college, church, clubs, sports, military training, and one's working
environment, all ofwhich contribute to value development. In the case of flag and general
officers, socialization seems to be heavily influenced by military service. The flag and
general officers interviewed for this study were asked to catagorize the effect of the military
in developing their personal, social, political, and moral values. As seen in Table 4.1, a
majority of the interviewees felt that the military had a "strong" influence on all four areas
of value development.
Table 4.1. Naval Flag and General Officer Opinions Concerning
the Importance of the Military in Shaping their Values
Importance of MilitarvfNumber Indicating)
Category of Strong Mild Weak
Values
Personal Values 10 1
Social Values 7 4
Political Values 6 5
Moral Values 7 4
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Of the eleven general and flag officers asked this question, ten responded that the
development of their personal values was strongly influenced by their military experience.
The strong influence of the military can also be seen in the development of social, political,
and moral values. It is clear that a strong relationship exists between the values held by these
flag and general officers and their military socialization.
While the socialization process of the military may play an important role in defining
and developing a "military mind," there is no reason to believe that shared values are not
present in some form among elected officials or society as well. Instead, these values are
more characteristic in defining and categorizing the flag and general officers as a group.
Many ofthe flag and general officers interviewed also expressed some concern over being
narrowly defined, as one admiral stated:
...[A]s you may have detected from answers to other questions, my military
experience has not prevented me from forming views and opinions that are
not straight down the line with the ultra-conservative right wing image that
some view the career military officer as holding. The strong effect is
certainly there, but I am proud to form my own opinions with full
consideration of factors not traditionally military. Most flag and general
officers I know would surely also fit this mold.
The vast majority of Americans, both male and female, have never served in the
military. Given current force requirements, a relatively small active-duty military, and the
stable security situation of the U.S., population participation in the military will most likely
not increase over the near future. With somewhere around 16,000 occupational groups in
America, any attempt to categorize a particular group seems futile. Even focusing on elected
officials, such as senators and representatives in Congress, proves difficult at best. Members
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of Congress seem to have developed in as many different circumstances as their districts are
far from each other. There is very little common schooling, let alone structured professional
development among these widely diverse groups. 59
In Chapter III, Tables 3.2 and 3.3 suggest that there is more consensus on defense
legislation among elected officials who served longer in public office, regardless of veteran
status. This also suggest that members who had less time in Congress, and were not
veterans, may not value defense issues as much as older or veteran members of Congress.
As a new generation ofnonveterans enters Congress, and issues of Congressional term limits
continue, the priority given to defense matters may be on the decline in Congress.
C. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
If the flag and general officer corps can be described as being of a "military mind,"
holding a set of values that reflect a more common base among their own ranks than with
elected officials, does tension necessarily develop between these two groups? Tension based
on values is a difficult subject to prove in the case ofthese two groups. Reviewing periodical
and newspaper articles covering events and speeches by these groups does little in
identifying any strained relationships based on values. The most direct and efficient
"Several studies have been conducted over the years concerning the demographic
characteristics of members of Congress, including their education, socioeconomic status, and
profession before election. These tend to show some shared traits, such as a relatively high
proportion of members who were in the legal profession. These shared experiences may lead to
some shared values; but the extent of the relationship is unclear. Congress by its very nature meets
to deliberate and negotiate interests from across the nation. Its institution is not designed to
perpetuate the same individuals through a career of service, but to form a Congress of elected
representatives of the people. Given this conflicting nature of prior occupations and Congressional
service, it is difficult to delineate a "Congressional Mind."
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approach seems to be gaining some consensus based on opinion interviews. In doing this,
I focused solely on flag and general officers.
The flag and general officers interviewed for this study gave a mixed response when
asked if tension and isolation, based on values, exist between the military's senior leaders
and elected officials. Half of those interviewed concluded that a higher standard of values
held by the flag and general officer corps has led to tension between these groups. The other
half felt that tension does not exist based on a difference in values, or if a higher standard of
values were held. However, several of the flag and general officers who felt this way
believed that a certain level of strained relations could be blamed on politicization of the
officer corps.
In conclusion, the flag and general officers interviewed here have mixed opinions on
the nature of value-based tension with elected officials. There is a strong emphasis on a core
set of values in both the Navy and Marine Corps, yet there does not seem to be any similar
organizational structure or emphasis on values among elected officials. Although flag and
general officers might agree that their military service has profoundly affected their views
on values, there is no consensus on whether this has created any sort of tension or discord
with Congress. However, as the military places greater emphasis on core values, will the




This thesis examines whether senior leaders of the naval service are becoming
isolated from society in terms of population participation, shared experiences, and values.
Based on this, several conclusions are drawn. First, racial and ethnic representation in the
flag and general officer corps will continue to lag behind levels of minority representation
in the national population; second, military experience among elected officials is declining;
and, finally, value differences may exist between senior military leaders and elected officials.
Each ofthese measures of association between society and senior military leaders highlights
some degree of isolation and possible tension in civil-military relations.
Conclusions from this study begin with racial and ethnic representation in the flag
and general officer corps. The "12-12-5 Plan" has been called a bold step to achieve
population diversity in the officer ranks of the Navy and Marine Corps by the early part of
the 21st century. However, with the minority population of the U.S. growing at such a rapid
rate, it is clear that the naval service will have great difficulty achieving an officer corps that
reflects the nation's minority composition.
This continuing, and probably expanding, gap in minority representation within the
officer corps will become even more pronounced among the more senior ranks. It takes an
average of about 30 years for a newly-commissioned officer to ascend to the level of admiral
or general. Without any special programs or intervention, minority promotions are subject
to the same criteria as the rest of the officer corps-that is, "best qualified." There is no
reason to believe, then, that the process of promotion through the ranks for minorities will
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be any faster than the average for all officers. In fact, it is more likely that competition to
reach the military's senior ranks will intensify over time, perhaps diminishing certain
opportunities for minorities relative to whites.
The data on racial and ethnic representation suggest that a certain level of structural
isolation already exists between society and senior military leaders. Many regard the
military's corps of senior leaders as a "good old boys" club, looking out for its own best
interest. This does not imply any racial or ethnic bigotry, but it does suggest resistance to
change, especially that which threatens to alter the military's "best qualified" system. This
attitude prevailed among most of the flag and general officers interviewed as part of this
study.
Some flag and general officers who were interviewed felt that minority representation
could be achieved without sacrificing any traditional criteria for individual commissioning
or advancement. This opinion is, perhaps, captured in Proposition 209 in California, which
seeks to eliminate affirmative action in state hiring, education, and contracts based on race
and gender. Actions such as Proposition 209 appear to say that one can support the
objectives of equal opportunity without eliminating "best qualified" criteria in recruiting and
promotions. Given the extremely political nature of "diversity" issues, they will most likely
continue to be a source of tension in civil-military relations. Yet, if the flag and general
officer corps does not become more racially and ethnically representative of society—as the
minority share of the general population continues to expand—this issue could prove to be
a source of strain, isolation, or division in civil-military relations.
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The second measure of isolation—military experience—focuses on the declining
numbers of veterans in Congress and a lack of military service experience by the President.
Senior military leaders who are involved in national security, defense policy, or defense
budgeting—to name a few—are "players" in the political process and debate that resolve
difficult, often controversial, defense issues. Traditionally, military leaders have not
interjected themselves or their views into the political process as a matter of institutional or
policy survival, but instead have advised or informed political leaders. This approach
prevents military leaders from becoming intertwined in the civilian political process of
elected representatives, thereby keeping military views neutral. Military leaders have felt
comfortable in their role during modern times because they were usually well-represented
by fellow veterans in the White House and Congress. However, as the number of military
veterans in Congress continues to decrease, the level of understanding concerning things
"military" is likely to decrease in that body as well. Additionally, the past voting behavior
of veterans versus nonveterans—on defense-related legislation in the 98th through the 102d
Congress—indicate veterans, along with older nonveteran members of Congress, are more
likely to vote pro-defense than are younger nonveterans. As younger nonveterans replace
older veteran and nonveteran members of Congress, a further decrease is likely in levels of
understanding concerning "things military."
This may give rise to an increased reliance on the senior leaders of the military to
guide, inform, or design defense policy. Another possible outcome is the emergence of a
civilian leadership that is distrustful of military involvement in decision making,
subordinating the military to a position of virtual exclusion. In either case, a growing
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isolation between "those who serve" and "those who did not" may be a source of tension in
civil-military relations.
Several flag and general officers interviewed in this study also suggest that a
decreased level of military experience in Congress could actually cause military leaders to
become more political in helping certain civilian leaders understand the military. This is the
"flip side of the coin" regarding levels of military experience in Congress or in the executive
branch. In this way, again, military influence in the decision making process may grow; and
a forced association of military and civilian leaders could help to bridge the existing divide
between the two.
Current tensions in civil-military relations may be a product to some extent of
military inexperience or "military illiteracy" in the legislative and executive branches of
government. Additionally, as the immediate security environment of the U.S. continues to
remain relatively stable, decreased emphasis may be placed on defense matters. This can be
seen in the nation's national security document, "Engagement and Enlargement," which
emphasizes the expansion of democracy through the promotion of free trade over traditional
defense issues. Additionally, the issue of recapitalization of defense equipment versus
maintaining current levels of readiness has highlighted a sharp divide in views on defense
policy. It is difficult to say whether or not this difference of opinion will eventually help to
strengthen the nation's defense. Nevertheless, as senior military leaders continue to fight for
resources and missions in the shrinking defense structure, and as the understanding of ''things
military" continues to decline among elected officials, a growing tension may develop
between Congress and the military establishment.
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In looking at values, it is evident that initial expectations were wrong regarding
differences between the senior leadership of the military and elected officials. In fact,
individuals in both of these groups have likely developed a unique set of values that are not
easily compared. Although flag and general officers may have a more narrowly-defined set
of values, obtained through military socialization, they also formulate opinions based on
many non-military factors. Still, Navy and Marine Corps leaders have placed a renewed
emphasis on the core values of honor, courage, and commitment. There may be little
evidence of value-based tensions in civil-military relations today; but, a society with an
apparently eroding value base is now pitted against a military with a strengthening value
base, and these two forces may be in opposition during the not-too-distant future.
It is inevitable, then, that civil-military relations will continue with a certain amount
of isolation and tension attributed to racial/ethnic differences, levels of military experience
among the nation's civilian leaders, and possible differences in values. This is expected,
given the generally conservative culture of the military—particularly among flag and general
officers—and the liberal underpinnings ofAmerican society. The military will probably not
shrink much more in size or influence, despite the missing Cold War-style menace. Nor is
American society likely to lose its predominantly liberal orientation. At the same time, there
is no reason to expect that the military will become widely popular in society and grow in
strength and influence to its Cold War levels, absent a significant threat to national security.
The potential consequences of this increasing tension and isolation in civil-military relations




To support and develop this thesis, a dialog was developed with several retired flag
and general officers from the Navy and Marine Corps. In total, seventeen flag and general
officers participated separately in discussions, either in person or through correspondence.
Eleven of these interviewees were retired flag officers; the other six were retired general
officers.
The following questions served as a basis for conversations and correspondence:
Q. 1 Do you think the representation of the Navy/Marine Corps officer and enlisted ranks
should be racially and ethnically proportionate with the U.S. population?
Q. 2 Do you think opportunities of advancement for racial and ethnic minorities are
better,worse, or about the same in the Navy / Marine Corps as in the private sector?
Q. 3 Do you think it is important for the President and the members of Congress to have
some military experience? Why is it important under our system of government?
Q. 4 What percentage of the U.S. population do you think should have served in the
military? Is an all-volunteer force detracting from this objective?
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Q. 5 What effect would you say the military had on developing your values in the
followingcategories?






equality, justice, liberty, religion,
community, pride in country, etc..)
Political Values
(example: civic responsibility, voting,
right vs. expediency, public service,
the "American Way," etc..)
Moral Values
(self responsibility, fairness,
value basis, example, lifestyle,
etc..)
Q. 6 Do you think a higher standard of values held by the flag and general officer corps
than the political structure (elected officials) will lead to tension and isolation of
these groups from each other? Does this condition already exist to some extent?
Q. 7 Do you think the members of Congress are becoming less knowledgeable in military
matters? How does this affect the relationship between Congress and the flag general
officer corps?
Confidentiality was promised the interviewees to solicit forthright and direct answers
to these questions and the subject material. Although direct quotes and summaries of
conversations appear in text, no effort was made to identify sources with comments.
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